Benson normative conceptions, such as the right or the good, are not viewed as objects that are fixed prior and given to the choosing self independent of its activity; rather, they are conceived as entailments of that activity, posited by and wholly expressive of the choosing self as the basic unit of responsible agency. 1 In this essay, I wish to consider this second, namely, the constructivist, conception of the normative. My intention is not to compare these two conceptions, much less to uncover and argue for the presuppositions of the constructivist approach. Instead, the main question that I want to explore is this: What must the normative first consist in when it is conceived as unqualifiedly immanent in responsible agency? By framing the question in these terms, I suppose for now, first, that a constructivist account of our normative conceptions may have a complex structure, in the sense that it may comprise a sequence of mutually distinct but interconnected parts that must be elucidated each in its turn, and, second, that these parts are ordered in accordance with a conception of lexical priority.
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To explore this question, I believe it will be most useful to consider Hegel's account of the normative in the Philosophy of Right. Like Kant's conception of practical philosophy, Hegel's may, I will suggest, be viewed as constructivist. However, Hegel is perhaps even more explicitly attentive to the question of the proper order of such an account. Briefly stated, a central thesis of the Philosophy of Right is that what Hegel calls "abstract right" is the lexically first part of the normative. In this essay, I hope to set forth the essential steps of his argument for that claim.
By way of introduction and in order to help fix ideas, let me for now simply assert some fundamental features of Hegel's constructivism. What is merely stipulated here will hopefully be explained and justified, at least to a certain extent, later on.
A first premise in Hegel's account is that the standpoint of the normative is identical with what I shall call the "general concept of the free will". Now Hegel analyses this general concept under the two aspects of form and content.' For present purposes, we may take the aspect of form as representing an understanding of individuals as free and equal responsible agents or, more exactly, as possessing the moral powers that are necessary for them to be such agents. This conception of the person is not something that must itself be constructed. Rather, it is something that can be elicited from our moral experience of responsible agency and it serves as the basis of construction, as that from which construction begins. The aspect of content, on the other hand, refers to any mode of existence in which this conception of the person is realized. This content, which Hegel calls "right," includes every kind of normative reality. Thus, it is not restricted to the right, as distinguished from the good, but incorporates both and more. And right is not a content that is given prior to and independent of the activity of free will. On me contrary, it is a generated world that is entirely constructed by free will and that is wholly expressive of its powers, namely, the moral powers of free and equal personhood.
Moreover, in Hegel's constructivism, the general concept of free will is made specific in the following way. The aspect of form becomes specific through an ordered sequence of different forms or structures of free will. 4 The conception of the person with its defining moral powers (in other words, the form of free will) is something complex. Thus the conception of the person as free and equal that serves as the basis of construction is not complete ab initio but is elucidated (though not itself constructed) through its own sequence. This sequence exhibits, step by step, the progressively adequate and complete determination as well as integration of the different moral powers that characterize free and equal persons. Similarly, the aspect of content is made specific through an ordered sequence of distinct yet interconnected modes of right (ranging from the right as embodied in bare interaction between two individuals to the right as realized in complex social and political institutions). And each different mode of right rests on and expresses a different structure of free will, a different moment, as it were, in the sequence of the forms of free will. So, for example, we shall see that abstract right is based on the specific form of free will (with its distinctive and relatively incomplete articulation of the moral powers of free and equal personhood) which Hegel refers to as "personality". 5 The essay has four parts. I begin, in the first, by indicating briefly in what way Hegel's conception of the normative is constructivist. More exactly, I try to identify the central features of the general concept of free will and try to show how they imply a constructivist conception of the normative. In the second and third parts, I try to explain why Hegel's constructivist conception must begin with the specific form, personality, and why the mode of right that rests on and expresses personality must be abstract right. My main object is to identify which moral power or powers constitute personality and which features characterize abstract right as, respectively, the lexically first specific Benson form and the lexically first specific content of free will in this constructivist conception of the normative. In a fourth and concluding part, I wish to explore whether collective rights are possible, given the priority of abstract right. The discussion will have to be less than systematic and more in the nature of a sketch of the needed argument.
I
In a constructivist conception, the standpoint of the normative is conceived as wholly immanent in the activity of the choosing self. Constructivism postulates a certain conception of responsible agency and elucidates the normative in terms of that conception. What, then, is the conception of responsible agency that informs Hegel's constructivism and how does his understanding of the standpoint of the normative in terms of the general concept of free will satisfy the constructivist requirement of immanence? I can address these important questions here only in the briefest way.
At the basis of Hegel's constructivism lies a conception of responsible agency that is, in its fundamental terms and import, very much like that of Kant's. 6 The general concept of the free will, as explicated by Hegel, views responsible agency as self-conscious purposive activity which is unqualifiedly self-determining in character. Hegel refers to the free will as a "thinking" will. 7 Being purposive, such activity begins with, and is directed toward, the realization of a conception formed by the subject; it is rooted therefore in thinking rather than in instinct or in some other merely natural necessity. More exactly, free will postulates a self-conscious subject that views itself as wholly independent of everything given to it prior to its activity and that therefore has itself qua free for its object. And it is in virtue of this thought of itself as free that the subject is self-determining. Now the fact that the subject is free just insofar as it views itself as such is itself something which the subject knows and which it seeks to make explicit. It does this by making the realization of this conception of itself its essential aim and purpose. The free will is thus thinking that gives its conception of itself existence in the element of self-conscious purposive activity. Or, conversely, it establishes self-conscious purposive activity as an exhibition of its conception of itself as free. Thinking in its theoretical function, or as cognition, has an object that, in relation to itself, must at least in part be taken as prior and independent. In contrast, thinking in its practical function, or as free will, gives itself an object that is wholly constituted through its own activity-an object that, far from being different from or independent of it, is the subject's very same conception of itself as free, only in the form of realized existence."
The Priority of Abstract Right
As I said in the introductory remarks, the general concept of free will is analyzed under the two aspects of form and content. I also suggested that we may view the aspects of form and content as referring respectively to the moral powers of free and equal persons and the ensemble of conditions (both internal and external to the self) in which that conception of the person is realized. Let us now take a closer look at what these two aspects entail.
The general concept of free will, viewed under the aspect of form, has a structure that may be analyzed in the following three steps. I shall briefly present these steps each in turn as distinct presuppositions in the understanding of responsible agency, without attempting, as Hegel does, to explain the way in which they may be conceptually interconnected. 9 First, if the will is to be conceived as a faculty of unconditioned free agency, that is, as endowed with a self-originating power to set ends for itself, we must postulate a subject which views itself as having a capacity to posit ends that are not in any way given to it independently of and prior to its activity of choosing. This power implies, at the least, an ability to choose that is not inevitably tied to or framed in terms of any particular object(s) as such. Accordingly, the subject regards itself as having a capacity to abstract from, that is, to distinguish itself from and to stand above, every determinate feature of experience, whether it be something that is internal to the subject, such as its inclinations, needs, or aims, or something that is external, such as its circumstances or relations with others. One who is accountable must, as such, be able to view every determinate content as a restriction which it can dissipate and transcend. It follows that what is not given to the subject is whatever remains when it views the determinate as something from which to abstract. And this can only be the consciousness of oneself as wholly unqualified by anything particular. Being without particular content, such self-consciousness entails a standpoint that is formal and universal. Now this standpoint constitutes the will's negative freedom: in virtue of it, the will is independent of everything that is extrinsic to its activity of choosing and it is thus fitted to be self-determining. 10 Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutic, trans. A. Miller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at paras. 1-3 and 10. 9. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ibid, at paras. 5-7. It should be noted that, although Hegel thinks that there can be a systematic rational account of the conception of the person as free and equal or of what I have called "the form of the general concept of free will" (which he seeks to provide in the Logic and Philosophy of Mind), he states that for the purposes of the Philosophy of Right he shall not attempt any such demonstration but will assume that the reader can, on reflection, discover that its essential features are latent in and presupposed by his or her everyday experience as a thinking, responsible agent. See Philosophy of Right, ibid, at para. 4R. 10. It should be emphasized that the independence spoken of here (which is a necessary aspect of the general concept of free will and which is therefore presupposed by its various specific forms) is only independence from the given as such. Each stage in the account of right has its specific way of expressing the will's independence from the given. Moreover, such independence does not imply that the self is to be characterized in abstraction from, or as indifferent to, normatively valid ethical ties of family or community, for example. Indeed, at the stage of free will that Hegel calls "ethical life," individuals are related to the ethical order (which comprises the family, civil society and the state) as accidents to substance. (Philosophy of Right, ibid, at para. 145) . This relation is possible, however, only if the ethical order can be represented, not as something given or extrinsic to free agency, but rather as its immanent realization. If attachment to family and community or to religious and philosophical views is to have normative validity and worth, it must not have its determining ground in a purely given or natural necessity.
Benson
If, however, the free will were defined only as independent of any content, it would not be represented as having a determinate content of its own-it would be simply undetermined. In this case, it would not be a will, for agency entails the willing of something: choice is directed toward the realization of this rather than that. Thus the first aspect, taken by itself, articulates only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of free agency. We must also postulate the subject's capacity to give itself a specific content. This is the second step in the analysis of the free will, in virtue of which the will is conceived as determinate activity, as incorporating reference to particularity, and therefore as something actual rather than merely potential.
But, further, if the free will is to be represented as se//"-detenriining, it must, in willing something particular, will itself alone. The free will is the activity of realizing its conception of itself as free: In willing something determinate, the subject must express its capacity to set ends for itself independent of the given. Therefore, in willing something particular, the subject must know the restriction as something which is its own, in which it is confined only because it has put itself there, and which it wills in order that its freedom may have determinacy and reality. The standpoint of formal universality entailed in the first step must be carried over and fulfilled in the second: this constitutes the will's positive freedom. And the integration of the two in the manner just indicated articulates, according to Hegel, the essential nature of the free will.
In sum, by the first step, the will is intelligible as potentially selfdetermining; by the second, as actually determined; and by their unity, as actually self-determining. This, then, is the form or structure of the general concept of free will. It represents the intelligibility of unqualified selfdetermining agency."
Viewed under the aspect of content, the general concept of free will is the right. As previously discussed, right is to be understood as the ensemble of conditions that express and realize the conception of the person as free and equal or, more exactly, as possessing the moral powers proper to this conception of the person. We have just seen that the form of free will entails the unity of the universal and particular in self-determination. Right may be viewed as the actualization of this unity in the shape of a constructed world or, in Hegel's words, like a second nature.
12 In contrast to nature proper, right is not a world that is given prior to and independent of free activity, but rather one that is actual through and expressive of such activity. Now insofar as right is nothing other than a mode of existence that realizes and expresses the concept of free will, it must always be respected as an end in itself. The reason is this. Because, as free will, the subject has the conception of itself as independent of the given for its sole object and goal, it necessarily views itself as unqualifiedly self-relating, as self-determining. Accordingly, 11. Kant's discussion of these conditions of free agency can be found in this is what it is from the standpoint of the normative. Consequently, the free will cannot, consistent with this standpoint, be treated merely as a means to and as conditioned by something else. The free will and all that it entails must be respected as an end in itself.
We are now in a position to see how the general concept of free will seems to satisfy the requisite conditions for conceiving the standpoint of the normative in constructivist terms. A constructivist account, I said, invokes a conception of the person, with its defining moral powers, that may be elicited from our moral experience of responsible agency. More precisely, we have seen that Hegel's constructivism is informed by an idea of responsible agency in which the subject is characterized by two essential features, namely a capacity to conceive of itself as independent from anything given, and a capacity to choose ends in accordance with the entailments of this selfconception. These two features completely and exhaustively articulate the most fundamental structure that is presupposed in the understanding of responsible agency: the first identifies the standpoint that must orient agency if there is to be accountability; the second explicitly relates this standpoint to the aspect of the choice of ends (which aspect is essential to the intelligibility of agency as such).
The form and content of the general concept of free will integrate these features in a manner that satisfies the three conditions of a constructivist account of the normative. Take the matter of self-sufficiency: in virtue of the subject's conception of itself as independent of everything given, that is, on account of its negative freedom, the free will and its entailments are represented as categorially independent of natural causal determination. In this way, the free will is conceived as self-grounded and as explicable only in terms of itself. Moreover, the required conception of validity is provided through the form of universality that is necessarily entailed by negative freedom. As a result, everything having to do with the mere particularity of the subject, such as inclination and subjective preference, is disqualified ab initio as a determining ground of choice: a conception of the normatively arbitrary is identified and excluded. In turn, the subject's positive freedom signifies that the justificatory basis of the choice of ends must be framed in terms of this form of universality: the categorially independent conception of normative validity is the unique perspective from which a responsible agent is to judge the propriety of its choice of ends. The standpoint of the normative is conceived here, not as an order that is given independent of and prior to the activity of choice, but as a form or structure that is wholly immanent in it. Finally, right, as the content that embodies this structure, is already implied by and is the completion of the very meaning of free will: for free will is nothing but the self-grounded and self-relating activity of practical thinking, that is, of thinking that is oriented toward its realization in the element of self-conscious purposive activity, and right is a world that is wholly constituted by and expressive of this activity. In brief, right is a freely constructed world, understood from a practical point of view. n With this understanding of the standpoint of the normative in mind, let us now turn to the central question of this essay: What is the first part of an account of the normative when the normative is conceived as wholly immanent in responsible agency? As I have already indicated, "first" is to be understood here not temporally but rather conceptually, as entailing lexical priority. To prevent misunderstanding, it seems desirable to emphasize at this point that, in Hegel's view, the lexical priority of a normative conception does not imply that it is the sole or even the most adequate expression of normativity; on the contrary, as merely the first, it is the most limited fulfillment of free will and it gives way to (while being preserved by) other, more adequate conceptions.
To answer this question, it is necessary to elucidate not merely the general concept of free will but a specific form and content of free will that embody the general concept. In doing so, I hope to substantiate, at least in part, the claim that the conception of the person is complex and that it must be analyzed in terms of specific forms of that conception, forms that belong to an ordered sequence in which the moral powers of free and equal persons are, step by step, determined and integrated in a fully adequate way. I believe we may also see more clearly how a content-a mode of right-can be said to rest on and to express this conception of the person.
Accordingly, we can restate the central question as follows: What is the lexically first way of conceiving free and equal persons and their essential moral powers, and what is the lexically first conception of right that rests on and expresses this understanding of the person? In the light of previous discussion, let us say for now that the answer must at least be: whatever is minimally entailed by the subject's negative freedom and minimally required to realize its positive freedom. If we can establish what these involve, we may then be able to see why they constitute an irreducibly distinct stage in the account of right and why their relation to other categories of right may properly be framed in terms of lexical priority."
The subject's negative freedom minimally entails the mere possible consciousness of itself as undetermined by everything determinate. It therefore consists just in the subject's power to distinguish itself from whatever object it may happen to want or from whatever condition in which it may happen to find itself: it is this feature that exhibits the subject's capacity to break the power of the given as such and to establish itself as not inevitably tied to any particular determination.
The elucidation of the subject's negative freedom begins, then, with relation to the given, but the postulated relation is wholly negative, because the subject has established every restriction as completely negated and transcended, and has denied all validity to it: the determinate is represented as something that has been categorially excluded as a possible justificatory ground of responsible choice. This negative relation to the given has, in turn, the following positive significance: qua distinguished from and independent of the given, the subject now has itself alone for its proper object; in knowing itself as a subject that has transcended every particular content and in having itself, conceived exclusively in this way, for its sole object, the subject is a self and necessarily views itself as an end in itself. In short, the subject's negative freedom minimally entails, not a general consciousness of itself as an ego concretely determined in this or that way, but rather a consciousness of itself as "a completely abstract ego in which every concrete restriction and value is negated and without validity."
14 Insofar as the subject conceives of itself in this way, it is, to use Hegel's term, personality. Personality is thus the specific form of free will that is minimally postulated in Hegel's account of the normative. 15 It is true that the elucidation of personality presupposes that individuals possess the requisite natural endowments and the acquired aptitudes to engage in self-conscious purposive activity as well as to recognize and honor the normative entailments of participation in it. However, the only moral power expressive of free will that is specifically attributed to a subject in virtue of its being personality is the faculty of knowing itself as undetermined by everything given and of having itself, conceived as independent, for its object and goal. It should be stated at the outset that although persons are represented as having this moral power, it does not follow that, from the standpoint of personality, individuals need have this conception of themselves explicitly before their minds. Personality, we shall see, implies merely that they can, on reflection, recognize this view of themselves as implicit in and presupposed by their understanding of responsible agency. According to Hegel, it is only when individuals have the status of "moral subjects" (in contrast to being mere persons) that they can be represented from the standpoint of the normative as explicitly adopting this conception of themselves as their own. 16 With these remarks in mind, let me try to identify more exactly what personality entails.
Personality is a form of self-consciousness in which the subject has for its object itself, unqualified by anything particular or determinate and utterly without internal differentiation or complexity. The self that the subject has for its object is both formally and substantively simple: it is a formally simple "I" that is not yet explicitly defined as a unity of many "I's"-its identity is not yet the more complex "we" that signifies a many-in-one; and it is a substantively simple "I" that does not yet contain in itself, but on the contrary abstracts from, the multiplicity of concrete factors that constitute the particular aspect of purposive activity. These factors may be internal (such as natural endowments and features, determinate needs or purposes) or external (for example, ties of relationship with others, contingent natural or social circumstances in which an 14. Philosophy of Right, supra, note 3 at para. 35. 15. Ibid, at paras. 35-36.1 note in passing that Hegel's use of the term "personality" seems to differ from that of Kant. For Kant, moral personality is "the freedom of a rational being under moral laws." The Philosophy of Law, supra, note 11 at 31-32. In Kant's usage then, personality seems to represent the form of the general concept, and not a specific form, of free will. 16. This is the case in the second stage of right, "morality." See, Philosophy of Right, supra, note 3 at paras. 105-07. In the present essay, the discussion of why individuals, as persons, need not subjectively regulate or view their ends in the light of this conception of themselves begins at infra, note 18 and accompanying text and culminates with the characterization of the relevant normative standpoint as "external," at infra, note 28 and accompanying text.
Benson agent is placed). The standpoint of personality is thus that of a simple unit inwardly aware of its sheer independence from everything given. And inasmuch as personality postulates the subject's unconditioned relation with itself, personality-and all that it implies-must be respected as an end in itself and never treated merely as a means to something else.
To prevent misunderstanding, it should be emphasized here that the attribution of independence does not imply that individuals can somehow strip themselves of their particular features and can exist, disembodied and unindividuated, without them. What is at stake in this attribution of independence is not the existence as such of these particular features (which the elucidation of personality simply assumes) but rather their normative significance when we view ourselves as capable of free choice. Now insofar as the standpoint of personality is unqualified by any particular content, subjects are necessarily identical in their capacity as persons: each is necessarily and identically a self-originating locus of negative freedom. That all individuals, qua persons, are indistinguishable and in this sense equal is necessarily contained in each subject's awareness of its being independent from determination by the given and thus of its being an end in itself: the "I" that each knows as independent is necessarily the same as every other "I". Let us call this entailment the "postulate of formal (abstract) equality."
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Being an entailment of negative freedom, the postulate of formal equality constitutes an unconditional normative criterion that must be respected in all our choices. It does not add to or alter in any way the utterly simple and contentless self-consciousness that characterizes personality but merely represents the universality that is inherent in this first formulation of negative freedom. Note that this form of universality is just the bare identity that subjects share as persons. Like personality itself, universality here is simple and contentless-it is formal or abstract universality. And, as we shall see, it is this abstract universality that must be preserved in the articulation of the subject's positive freedom.
This, then, is, briefly stated, the minimally presupposed specific form of the subject's negative freedom. But free will, we saw, entails the determination of the subject's negative freedom as positive freedom. How are we to construe its positive freedom consistently with the standpoint of its negative freedom? Positive freedom, it will be recalled, consists in the subject willing a determinate object in a way that embodies the very same conception of self contained in its negative freedom. Here, therefore, a determinate content would have to be postulated that reflects nothing save the formal self-relatedness and independence of personality as well as its entailment, the idea of formal equality. The question is then: Given that the subject, as choosing agent, must choose something, how are we to conceive its determinate choosing such that it exhibits nothing other than the subject's capacity to have itself, qua independent, for its object and end? If we can answer this question, we will have found the minimally presupposed content of free will, the "embodiment of personality," to use Hegel's phrase. And this content, we shall see, constitutes abstract right. To begin, let us consider what the subject's negative freedom excludes as a possible conception of its positive freedom.
First, with respect to form, the standpoint of personality entails that the determinate aspect cannot figure as an end which expresses the subject's freedom: positive freedom cannot be framed in terms of an end that is to be attained. To see why, we must keep in mind that the freedom of personality (and therefore its constitutive moral power) consists solely in the subject's capacity to distinguish itself from, and to know itself as independent of, every particular determination: the exclusive aim, as it were, of the subject qua personality is to maintain its independence from every determinate aspect of purposive activity rather than to form and pursue determinate ends of action through which it can express its freedom. Notwithstanding the rich concreteness and apparent value of the content represented by these particulars, they are wholly without validity from the standpoint of personality, being given to the choosing self prior to and independent of its activity. That they lack validity is just what must minimally be established by the subject if it is to be vindicated as self-determining, and this is established through the subject being a person. Thus while the subject, as a choosing agent, always chooses something (this rather than that) and therefore, we assume, has determinate ends, the normative significance of its choice, considered solely from the standpoint of abstract personality, lies neither in its determinate content nor in its being directed toward an end as such but only in its compatibility with the subject's independence from every determination and with whatever such independence implies. In order to reflect this standpoint, the determinacy postulated in positive freedom must not, then, be framed in terms of ends, the pursuit of which is deemed to be constitutive of the subject's freedom.
We may put the fundamental point this way: unless the subject just is personality, that is, is realized as distinct from the determinate aspect of its agency, it cannot have the realization of the freedom of personality (and whatever this entails) in that determinate element for its end and object; and conversely, unless the determinate aspect is first posited by the subject as something that is not given to it prior to and independent of its activity, the determinate element cannot provide the subject with an object which is directly suitable to express its free purposive capacity. When the form of free will is still personality, directedness toward ends is not as such part of selfdetermination."
Second, in terms of content, the determinate aspect in positive freedom cannot lie in personality itself, since, we have seen, it is wholly and inherently indeterminate. Nor can that determinacy be found in the relation of personality 18. It is important to keep in mind that the self's merely negative relation of independence to its determinate features (native endowments, particular purposes, ties of relationship, and so forth) is characteristic of only one specific form of free will, namely personality, and it reflects the fact that at the start those features must be established as not given to the choosing self. With the other forms in which free and equal personhood is expressed, these determinate features can be progressively integrated, insofar as they are no longer merely given. Benson to personality: taken by itself, the personality of the second is just as indeterminate as that of the first; and the relation between them, which at this point can be framed only in terms of the postulate of formal equality, states nothing more than their identity as wholly without determinacy. In contrast to personality, the concrete features of purposive activity are particular and determinate. As such, they constitute the only material that can possibly function as a determinate aspect expressive of the subject's freedom. However, as just discussed, they cannot do so in the form of ends or purposes of action through which the subject is to realize its freedom. Under what condition, then, can these concrete features function as determinate aspects of choice in such a way that they are constructed by practical thinking and thus reflect the standpoint of personality alone? The required condition, as I will now try to explain, is that they be treated as things that persons can have as their exclusive individual property. We shall see that the minimally presupposed articulation of positive freedom is that subjects be respected as persons having a juridical capacity to possess things as their individual property.
Since the freedom of personality consists in the subject's distinguishing and detaching itself from everything particular, the subject establishes the latter as something that is immediately different from personality and therefore as something that is not self-related or free. Notwithstanding the rich concreteness of content represented by these particulars, they share, at the start, the same form of being given to and not by practical thinking. In relation to free will, their only significance is that they do not have intrinsic validity: this is what they are, that is, this is their essence, from the standpoint of the normative. Being without the form of self-relatedness, they can therefore, consistent with this standpoint, be used merely as means to something else. The normative significance of the particular aspects of purposive activity, insofar as they count as merely distinct from personality, is only that they are something usable. In normative terms, they are things. "Thing," like "personality," denotes a mode of existence rather than an entity as such, and more specifically a mode of existence that contrasts with the self-relatedness of personality: a thing is anything determinate-whether a capacity, an action or an object in the external world-that, being established as immediately different from personality, is, normatively, something which can be treated merely as a means. The concrete features of purposive activity are considered solely in relation to the standpoint of personality; they are represented, not in terms of their different particular contents, but formally, as abstractly identical things. The characterization of their essence in these terms constitutes the first step in the conceptualization of a determinate aspect of willing that is given by and not to practical thinking."
Thus far, we have reached the conclusion that the normative intelligibility of the particular aspects of purposive activity necessarily consists in their being things that can be used as means to external ends. In the light of what has been said, it follows that it must be normatively possible, that is, permissible, for a free agent to subordinate things to its purposive capacity. Stated in terms of its opposite, there can be no prohibition that would place usable things beyond the purposes of persons.
For there to be such a prohibition, it would have to be required either by the nature of a thing or by the nature of personality. But insofar as something falls under the category of thing, it contains nothing that can exclude its being subordinated to extrinsic purposes or that can determine the normatively possible purposes to which it may be put. And, similarly, there is nothing in personality that precludes such an object being used as a means. As already discussed, qua personality, the subject's relation to particular determinations is negative: it knows itself as independent of and undetermined by everything given. This negative relation has the following two implications: that the particular, being distinguished from the subject, can, in normative terms, be used merely as a means, and that the subject, being under no positive requirement to realize its personality in the element of the particular, is not obliged to subordinate things to its purposes. The conclusion that it must be permissible for a subject to use things is consistent with these implications. The contrary conclusion would signify that there can be no determinacy expressive of the subject's negative freedom at this first stage of its freedom and, consequently, that its positive freedom is inconceivable. This would entail, in short, the impossibility of elucidating responsible agency as an expression of unconditioned freedom. This consequence cannot be required by or explicated through negative freedom, for the latter would then have to be postulated as a capacity for self-determination that precludes the possibility of its own actualization-which is absurd. 20 Now, if the capacity to use of things merely as means to one's purposes is to constitute the most elementary articulation of positive freedom, it remains to be shown more exactly how this capacity can be construed to reflect exclusively the conception of self entailed by negative freedom. We must be able to construct a conception of permissible (but not obligatory) use that enshrines nothing save the postulate of formal equality. In this way alone can there be determinate willing that is wholly given by practical thinking and that thus embodies only the standpoint of personality. More specifically, the conception of permissible use must reflect the specific character of freedom entailed by personality which, I have said, consists in this: that the sole aim of the subject is to maintain its formal independence from particularity in whatever it happens to choose. Let me try to explain how such a conception of permissible use is to be construed. freedom in terms of persons and things is categorially independent of-and so need not constitute-the conceptions of value or particular interests that individuals may wish to realize. 20. This argument draws on paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Philosophy of Right, supra, note 3 as well as on Kant's elucidation of the "juridical postulate of practical reason" in his Philosophy of Law, supra, note 11 at 62-64.
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First, the relation of subject, qua personality, to thing is one of ownership. The connection between the two must be conceived such that it preserves the categorial difference between person and thing. Therefore, the relation between subject and thing must not be construed as one of identity: in relation to me, a thing cannot count as another "I" but only as a determinate "mine".
Second, the subject that relates to a thing as its own is the utterly simple and contentless self postulated in negative freedom: as we saw, one views oneself as "I", as a bare self-relating locus of responsible agency. Accordingly, subjects count merely as identically separate persons. The capacity to relate to things as one's own is-and at this point can only be-attributed to and exercised by subjects conceived in this way. Ownership is thus individual or private in character. 21 Third, the conception of ownership that is at stake here is merely the capacity to have things as one's own. This is what constitutes the subject's positive freedom and what must be accorded respect. I have referred to this capacity for ownership as juridical in nature. That it is to be so characterized follows, I hope to show, from the specific nature of the freedom entailed by personality.
To begin, let us recall the conclusion that, given personality's essential indifference to and transcendence of everything particular, we can only hold that it must be normatively possible (but not necessary) for individuals to use things as means. Consistent with this premise, neither ownership itself, nor any constituent element in the account of ownership, nor even the requirement to respect the capacity for ownership, is to be construed in terms that presuppose that the subject's freedom is constituted through its adopting anything whatever-whether it be a substantive content of some sort or the requirement of respect itself-as its end: the relevant standpoint here is not that of virtue.
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Those aspects of purposive activity that may be significant in judging conduct or character from the standpoint of the adoption of required ends are therefore irrelevant. Moreover, the justificatory basis of the capacity for ownership cannot be that it satisfies any interest or need, or that it is necessary for individual moral development, if such interests or development go beyond the bare (highest-order) interest of the subject in affirming its contentless and simple conception of itself as independent from everything given, whether from within or from without. Otherwise, ownership could not signify merely the preservation of the standpoint of personality in whatever one happens to choose. Of course, individuals choose to make things their own in order to serve their particular interests, purposes, and needs; however, this alone does 21. Philosophy of Right, ibid, at para. 3, par. 46. At this point, ownership that is in common must be the result of a contract among individuals, each with a capacity for exclusive ownership, and it is therefore inherently dissoluble in character. 22. Ibid, at paras. 37, 38, 45, 49, and 104. See text accompanying note 18, supra. Kant makes this point explicitly: "As Right in general has for its object only what is external in actions, Strict Right, as that with which nothing ethical is intermingled, requires no other motives of action than those that are merely external; for it is then pure Right, and is unmixed with any prescriptions of Virtue ... Now such Right is founded, no doubt, upon the consciousness of the Obligation of every individual according to the Law; but if it is to be pure as such, it neither may or should refer to this consciousness as a motive by which to determine the free act of the will." Philosophy of Law, supra, note 11 at 47-48.
not make such factors normatively relevant. It is only in relation to the standpoint of the normative that such relevance can be determined. And where we are considering the most elementary mode in which that standpoint is expressed, it is personality-and it alone-that can provide the criterion of relevance.
More specifically, conceived in the light of the freedom of personality and its entailment, namely, the requirement to respect formal equality, the juridical capacity for ownership has the following three characteristics: it is negative, interactional, and external. I will discuss each of these in turn.
(A) The requirement to respect a person's capacity for ownership is negative in character: it stipulates merely that individuals are to do nothing that is inconsistent with the independence of personality." Or, to frame the requirement positively in terms of what can be enjoined: action is not obligatory for the reason, even in part, that through it an end can be realized. Reference to ends cannot figure in any way as a premise in the justification. This follows from the previously discussed point that the freedom of subjects qua persons does not consist in the pursuit of anything as an end; on the contrary, freedom here lies solely in their capacity to detach themselves from every particular end as such. Accordingly, the requirement to respect a person's capacity for ownership qualifies the choice of ends as permissible or impermissible, not as obligatory. Its commands are, in the final analysis, always prohibitions, not positive duties: it does not impose a positive obligation upon individuals to appropriate and to make use of things or to assist others to do so. The meaning of this requirement of respect is merely that things must always be treated as susceptible of being owned (by someone) and persons must always be treated as capable of ownership (but never as objects of ownership). Thus, the requirement to respect formal equality is not infringed just by the absence of ownership: respect for the possibility of ownership does not entail that any individual must in fact have something as his or her own. To avoid misunderstanding, one should keep in mind the main idea: while the relevant criterion of evaluation, namely, respect for formal equality, applies to action, it is wholly indifferent to the standpoint that informs, and to the interests that are realized in, the pursuit of ends, whether permissible or obligatory. At this point, the pursuit of ends counts merely as a contingent factual happening that is, as such, devoid of inherent normative significance. Here positive freedom resides solely in the maintenance of the abstract standpoint of personality (and of its entailment, respect for formal equality), not in the pursuit of ends as such. To be sure, actions that are inconsistent with this requirement of respect are prohibited. This is entailed by the application of the criterion. So, we may say, positive freedom (abstract right) articulates a criterion in the light of which actions are intelligible as permitted or prohibited. However, in doing so, it merely sets the stage for the next step in Hegel's analysis of right, namely morality, where positive freedom now consists in, and is realized through, the pursuit of permissible ends and the satisfaction of the agent's interests contained therein. This gives rise to a qualitatively distinct complex of rights and duties that directly integrates such factors as the agent's particular intentions, purposes, insight, and needs-factors which were hitherto categorially irrelevant. For further discussion, see supra, note IS and accompanying text. 24. Jeremy Waldron interprets Hegel to be saying die contrary: "If one never actually gains control of any object then one never gets the benefits of the exercise of one's will on objects: one's will, then, never develops in the way that Hegel thinks it is important for it to develop." J. Waldron, Moreover, since, with respect to their personality, all individuals are identical, it makes no difference whatsoever which individual has acquired ownership. The appropriation of everything by one has the same normative significance as the appropriation of something by everyone: great inequality in holdings and even sheer propertylessness can, as such, be perfectly consistent with respect for each person's equal capacity for ownership. The existence or absence of holdings has normative significance only insofar as it may infringe the negative requirement of respect for formal equality, which, we have seen, is independent of the whole sphere of particularity, that is, of all considerations relating to wants, needs, or welfare. Thus, respect for the individual capacity for ownership does not entail that a certain level of welfare must be maintained through the allocation of property entitlements. Whether holdings are fair in the light of a criterion of distribution is categorially irrelevant to their justification. Right is, at this stage, purely non-distributive in conception.
(B) The requirement to respect a person's capacity for ownership is structured interactionally: the basic unit of analysis is a relation of correlative right and duty between two separate yet formally equal persons. Here again, we try to derive this feature from the fundamental proposition that, as persons, individuals need not appropriate things for their use in order to realize their freedom: personality, and all that it entails, is fully preserved as an end in itself merely if the subject does nothing that is inconsistent with its simple and contentless independence from every particular determination.
We have seen that, because persons are not obliged to appropriate or to help others to do so, the requirement to respect the capacity for ownership pertains only to something that is already one's own. To this we now add the following qualification: it must be something that is already another's own.
To see why, consider first my choosing to do something with my own things. Because I am not obliged to acquire anything or, for the same reason, to continue to own something that is already mine, I need not view the subordination of a thing to my purposes as something that, where I alone am concerned, I must respect as an end in itself: it counts merely as a particular determination from which I can abstract at will, consistently with my independence and freedom. Whatever I do in this regard cannot possibly affect my capacity for ownership. However, the same cannot be said of my actions that may affect another's thing, that is, something which another has already subjected to his or her purposes. I cannot rightly view the embodiment of the other's will as nothing more than a particular determination which I may negate at will. On the contrary, it contains the other's will and if I affect it, my doing so does not, in itself, express the other's independence (since, from the other's standpoint, my choice counts merely as an external factor from which to abstract) but only my own. Thus, I must treat the embodiment of another's will as an end in itself and, by impinging on it, I can affect his or her capacity for ownership.
If we combine the point, that the requirement of respect only applies insofar as one person can affect what already belongs to another, with our prior conclusions, namely, that the capacity for ownership is attributed to formally equal but separate persons and that each person's capacity must be respected as an end in itself, we arrive at the following idea: whether formal equality has been respected is decided in the context of a two-person interaction, where one has affected in some way what already belongs to another. The requirement of respect is stipulated in terms of a two-person relationship, such that the existence of a relationship of this kind, taken by itself, is not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition of the applicability of the normative criterion. Thus, where interaction involves more than two individuals, it must be possible to conceptualize the interaction, for the purposes of normative evaluation, either as entailing in fact only a two-person relationship or as comprising a number of distinct two-person relationships, each of which must satisfy formal equality. The two-person relationship always constitutes, normatively speaking, the relevant standpoint of analysis.
Furthermore, in relation to others, the exercise of one's capacity for ownership is not to be conceived as a mere liberty but rather as giving rise to a genuine right that others have a corresponding duty to respect. Supposing that an individual's choice has been effectively manifested with respect to the use of a thing that can, consistently with formal equality, be appropriated by that individual, that decision must be respected as an end in itself if positive freedom is to be possible. 26 For an individual's manifestation of choice in these circumstances has, taken by itself, universal import: given that individuals are identical as persons, it signifies that the subject, as free will and thus as necessarily and completely representative of everyone, has chosen with respect to a determinate object. But this is nothing less than positive freedom itself which, because it embodies the standpoint of the normative, constitutes an end that must be respected in every act of choice. The failure to respect another's decision regarding the use of his or her thing eo ipso denies the possibility of any person-and therefore the wrongdoer also-choosing a determinate object in a way that must be respected as an end in itself. Accordingly, the requirement to respect another's capacity for ownership must be framed as a duty to respect another's right.
To this it might be objected that it would be consistent with positive freedom for a second person to displace the first without his or her consent, because, in doing so, the second merely substitutes his or her identical will (to use the thing) for the first's. The objection holds that, in this circumstance, the second will can properly be viewed as the equivalent of the first. But this is to ignore that the first person's will has already been expressed and that it must therefore be respected as an end in itself, for which there can be no equivalent. This point can be made in another way. The second can count as the equivalent of the first only insofar as it is identical to it. However, the sameness of individuals consists here solely in their being formally equal ends in themselves. By failing to accord the first respect, the second violates their identity as persons and so cannot be represented as equivalent.
We conclude, then, that the fundamental unit of analysis is a relation between two persons having correlative rights and duties: a person's duty is always owed to another, who has a corresponding right. In other words persons do not have duties toward themselves. Where ownership is private and persons have obligations only with respect to another's capacity for ownership, right and duty cannot coalesce in one person with respect to the same object of ownership.
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(C) The final characteristic of the capacity for ownership when it is construed in the light of the postulate of formal equality is what I shall call its "e.xternar nature. 28 We start, once more, with the fundamental premise that the requirement to respect the capacity for ownership does not imply that anything, including the requirement itself, must be adopted as an end. Accordingly, the requirement does not determine the propriety of choices in the light of an individual's purposes (subjective understandings, intentions, and so on) as such. This feature has three implications that define the requirement's external character.
First, the requirement applies only to acts that can actually affect another's capacity for ownership: purposes which are not manifested in actions that can do so are as such normatively irrelevant. There must be, in other words, an external manifestation of will that can impinge upon what is already another's. Second, the normative validity of an action is decided, not by reference to its author's subjective intentions, purposes and understandings as such, but in terms of conditions of respect that one ought reasonably to subscribe to when one's actions can impinge on another. The standpoint of evaluation is public and relational. Third, the applicability of the requirement does not depend upon an individual assenting to it. Persons are under its jurisdiction simply in virtue of their having manifested a capacity for responsible choice. Just as the requirement does not oblige individuals to pursue anything as an end-including the requirement of respect itself-so its vindication, in the face of an action that is inconsistent with it, does not depend upon the author of the action subjectively regarding the vindication as a desirable or as an obligatory end: the vindication can, consistently with personality, be exercised upon the agent through coercion.
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In sum, the requirement to respect the capacity for ownership commands that one's external actions be consistent with the entailments of positive freedom, that is, with the use of things by persons having the status of an end in itself. However, as I have tried to emphasize, it does not command (as virtue arguably requires) that one will this respect as one's end and that one make its standpoint one's own. This minimally presupposed articulation of positive freedom does not postulate the goodness of intention or of purpose as an aspect of the normative; it determines merely the permissibility of ends through a conception of respect for the capacity to own that, being negative, interactional, and external, is juridical rather than ethical in character." 1 Let me now try to gather together the main points discussed dius far in this part. What I have attempted to outline is a way of conceiving choice with respect to a determinate object that presupposes only-and adds nothing categorially new to-the standpoint of negative freedom, as it must be minimally expressed. The argument can be summarized in the following five propositions. First, a certain notion of the person, namely pefsonality, must be postulated as the minimally presupposed specific form of free will and as expressive of the subject's negative freedom: unless we begin with this notion of the person, we cannot adduce a normatively valid criterion with which to evaluate conduct. Second, the sole criterion that is implied by this conception of the person and that is therefore minimally but necessarily entailed by the standpoint of the normative is the postulate of formal equality: all our choices must be consistent with it and with whatever follows from it. Third, a conception of positive freedom that exhibits personality must be framed in terms of the possibility of ownership, elucidated in the light of this postulate. This idea of ownership constitutes the most elementary specific content of free Benson will. Fourth, the possibility of ownership is represented as a normative, or more exactly, a juridical capacity inhering in separate yet formally equal persons, a capacity that must be respected in our every choice. Fifth, consistently with the postulate of formal equality, the requirement to respect this capacity is articulated as a negative duty to respect what is already another's own; and this duty can be coercively enforced against an agent insofar as it action can actually impinge upon another's right of ownership. In short, the requirement of respect is negative, interactional, and external in character. These five propositions suggest an understanding of negative and positive freedom which is, I believe, internally coherent and minimally presupposed in a constructivist account of our normative conceptions. The requirement to respect each person's juridical capacity for ownership is abstract right. Abstract right thus represents the most elementary mode in which a subject's willing can be determinate in a way that exhibits its conception of itself as free. The relation between subject and object postulated in abstract right enshrines nothing less-but also nothing more-than the categorial distinction between persons, who, necessarily viewing themselves as ends in themselves, should always be accorded respect, and things, which, lacking unqualified selfrelatedness, may be used merely as means. Moreover, because this distinction states the essential first condition under which something is to be accorded respect, it marks the necessary first step in understanding how there can be an unconditional entitlement to anything at all. Accordingly, we may formulate the meaning of abstract right as follows: the individual capacity to make use of things consistently with formal equality represents the first way in which a subject can be entitled to anything as such. The subject of abstract right is a person with a bare capacity for rights.
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Thus far, I have tried to explain why personality and abstract right are minimally presupposed in Hegel's constructivist account of the normative. But I have also suggested that Hegel's claim, more exactly stated, is that abstract right is the lexically first content of free will and that it rests on personality, the lexically first form of free will. In this part, I should like to make three very brief comments about the basis and significance of this claim of lexical priority. In the fourth and concluding part, I will consider briefly whether collective rights are possible, given the priority of abstract right.
First, we are now in a position to see more clearly why the relation of personality and abstract right to other modes of free will must be conceived in terms of lexical priority. Because both personality and abstract right are specifications of free will, that is, of unqualifiedly self-determining agency, they cannot be represented as mere means to something else: whatever they essentially entail must be respected as an end in itself. Supposing that there are other things that qualify as specific forms and contents of free will, these must preserve whatever is essential to the intelligibility of personality and abstract right. And since personality and abstract right are minimally presupposed, the condition of the possibility of such other forms and contents of free will is that they first of all be consistent with and satisfy what abstract right requires. Hence its lexical priority.
Second, personality and abstract right constitute a distinct normative whole that gives specific expression to the idea of free agency. As personality, the self is endowed merely with the moral power of affirming a conception of itself in which it is represented as independent of every particular determination. Although, as we saw, Hegel's constructivism certainly accepts that the structure of choice must be characterized by determinacy, mat is, choice must be directed toward this rather than that end, it can only vindicate the idea of free agency if it begins with a specific normative category that denies inherent normative significance to the particular and that does not yet incorporate action-directed-toward-ends as part of freedom. Accordingly, the moral power ascribed to individuals in virtue of their being personality is not framed in terms of a capacity to realize ends. In other words, the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good (as understood by Rawls) is not yet postulated as a moral power of free and equal persons. Here, the sole end of the self, the only mode in which it realizes itself, is merely the affirmation of its independence from every determination, from every particular end. When the self is still personality, free agency does not consist in the effort to give determinate expression to personality: agents need not make the conception of themselves as independent their principle in the pursuit of particular ends.
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Abstract right, which is constructed on die basis of personality, expresses this limited moral power in the element of determinate purposive activity. Stated negatively, the key to understanding the specific character of abstract right is that here, in Hegel's words, "there is no question of particular interests, of my advantage or my welfare, any more dian there is of the particular motive behind my volition, of insight and intention."" These considerations presuppose something more than the purely formal equality enshrined in abstract right, namely, a form or structure of freedom that consists in the will being directed toward the realization of particular ends and the satisfaction of particular interests. Indeed, given that persons in abstract right have no end except the bare affirmation of themselves as independent from every determination, not even abstract right's requirement of respect is something Benson which they must adopt as an obligatory end (for they have none) or something which they must follow for its own sake. In abstract right, the capacity for an effective sense of justice is realized just in a purely external mode consisting in this: that a responsible agent is rightly subject to coercion by another (with whatever purpose or intention) if that agent has violated the other's entitlement.* 4 We have seen that the relevant standpoint in abstract right is always framed in terms of an external relation between two formally equal persons in which each is represented as having a bare juridical capacity for ownership. This negative, interactional, and external standpoint differs not only from the inwardness of virtue (which postulates obligatory ends) but also from the normatively more complex distributive standpoint that informs the notion of cooperative association on fair and equal terms. For instance, in light of the abstractness of abstract right, a conception of needs which, in contrast to desires, can express normatively valid requirements, is not yet postulated as an aspect of self-determination. There is accordingly no place yet for a doctrine of primary goods or for a conception of the needs of free and equal persons that can provide a basis for legitimate claims to distributive shares.' 5 And because abstract right's requirement of respect is categorially non-distributive in character, it cannot serve to ground a principle of reciprocity or mutual advantage that might regulate the production and the division of the benefits of collaborative undertakings.
However, on Hegel's view, the non-distributive character of abstract right should not be taken to imply that, in a subsequent stage of right, individual entitlements may not be determined in accordance with a suitable principle of distribution. What must be respected in order to satisfy abstract right is every individual's capacity, as a person, to subject things to his or her purposes. As long as things are treated as usable and persons as beyond mere use, personality is respected. Now when the relevant normative standpoint is that of the correlative rights and duties of individuals viewed as separate, though formally equal, interacting persons rather than, say, as members of civil society or as citizens of a state, right entitles individuals to obtain whatever and however much they can through the permissible modes of acquisition (which are, according to both Hegel and Kant, first occupancy and contract). With abstract right, there are as yet no moral considerations that might validly qualify or limit this entitlement. Thus, in abstract right, a person rightfully complains if any thing is placed beyond the possibility of individual 34. See supra, note 29. 35. I have in mind Rawls' account of the primary goods. According to Rawls, the primary goods are introduced so that rationally autonomous parties in the original position can make a rational agreement on behalf of the persons they represent: given the restrictions of the veil of ignorance, they are to do the best they can to advance the determinate good of those persons. See, for example, Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and their Priority" in S. McMurrin, ed.. Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 3 (Salt Lake City: University Utah Press, 1982) 3 at 18-22. The primary goods are necessary, then, on the supposition that an interest in realizing a determinate conception of the good can be attributed to free and equal persons. But this, I have" tried to show, is not yet the case in abstract right. Abstract right does not postulate even a thin theory of the good. This seems to confirm, from within a constructivist approach, Rawls' view that "primary goods are not to be used in making comparisons in all situations but only in questions of justice which arise in regard to the basic structure." "Social Unity and Primary Goods," supra, note 32 at 163.
acquisition. But this need not be so when the normative standpoint incorporates other categories of right which, let us assume, rest on fuller, more complex specifications of free and equal personhood than does abstract right. It is Hegel's view that the institutions of ethical life, namely the family, civil society, and the state, actually satisfy this criterion. Consequently, the sphere that is subject to unqualified individual appropriation may be determined and limited in accordance with the entailments of freedom embodied in these. Such limitation can be consistent with abstract right because abstract right, in virtue of what I have called its "negative" character, is not a right to any thing or any bundle of things as such. In short, abstract right does not definitively determine either the content or the extent of property ownership.
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My third and final remark concerns the way in which a sequence of normative categories is generated. In Hegel's account, the elucidation of a lexically second form and content of free will is effected through the systematic exploration of abstract right's inherent limits as an expression of free will." The second category of right is established by showing that it is needed and able to resolve certain fundamental tensions that characterize abstract right and that challenge its self-sufficiency on its own terms. The justification of the second category is thus thoroughly immanent to the analysis of abstract right itself. In specific terms, the transition to the second category is shown to be necessary through a consideration of the meaning of wrong and its annulment. I shall conclude by briefly indicating how.
Because, in abstract right, individuals are not obligated toward any end (including right itself), it is normatively a matter of chance whether an agent's particular choices conform with the abstract equality of personality. Hence abstract right is inherently and necessarily vulnerable to wrong. Wrong constitutes a particular external expression of choice that violates the abstract equality of persons and that is therefore inconsistent with its own essential normative basis. For this reason, it is intrinsically self-contradictory. However, a wrongful act, as an external manifestation of will, also has a positive existence in the following sense. It alters the world and this alteration, being the outcome of an act of will, seems to challenge the validity of right, which, on a constructivist approach, is conceived as immanent to willing. The alteration must therefore be annulled by a second act of will in order to make manifest that it is without validity. Only in this way can right be genuinely vindicated as something explicitly and actually valid. But this required annulment can be effected only through an individual's particular will and it is here that abstract right generates a basic problem which it cannot solve with its own resources. Precisely because the determinate aspect of willing is not yet part of the will's freedom and consequently can be something merely arbitrary and subjective, individuals cannot annul wrong in a way that objectively establishes it as invalid. Being subjective and contingent in form, the effort to annul wrong must be inadequate to the universality and necessity of its import and so it can reasonably be regarded by others as itself a transgression. Because the standpoint of judgment in abstract right is public and relational, how something appears to others expresses its essential character as such. Each response to wrong, entailing as it does the positive action of a particular will, becomes in turn a new transgression that is selfcontradictory in character and that consequently needs to be annulled, and so on ad infinitum. The sphere of abstract right turns out to be a condition of wrong in the highest degree because here action cannot posit the normative validity inherent in free agency as valid with respect to the interactions it is meant to govern unconditionally.
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In short, the requirement to respect formal equality can only be actualized at this point through a means, namely, the will in its particularity, which, being essentially unfree, is categorially unsuited to the task. This tension-that abstract right is vulnerable to and challenged by wrong but cannot annul it in accordance with its own criterion of objectivity-can be resolved only if the exclusion of determinacy from freedom is superseded, so that the will, "though particular and subjective, yet wills the universal as such". 39 What is needed is a form of free will in which the moral powers of free and equal persons are now elaborated such that subjects have a highest-order interest to realize the requirement of respect for formal equality as their end and goal. The account of this form and of its realization belongs to a second stage of right, which Hegel calls "morality," the transition to it being required by abstract right itself. 
IV
By way of conclusion, I would like now to consider very briefly the following question: given the priority of abstract right, can there be collective rights on a constructivist conception of the normative, and, if so, how must they be framed?
To begin, let me try to fix ideas by identifying the kind of "collective right" that is at issue here. For the purposes of this question, I shall assume that the subject of right is still the individual viewed as a free and equal person, although endowed perhaps with moral powers that are more complex than personality's bare capacity for abstraction. In other words, I shall not take the subject of right to be, in Hegel's terms, an institution of ethical life itself, such as the family, civil society, or the state. According to Hegel, the family, for example, constitutes a subject of right, with individuals being viewed just as members ("accidents") of this whole.'' 0 On this conception, one can intelligibly refer to the right inhering in the family, and this right is conceived as going beyond, while respecting, the more limited standpoint of abstract right. In this sense, then, "collective rights" are certainly possible in Hegel's account. Indeed they are necessary. But I think the contemporary debate over collective rights concerns something very different, namely, whether such rights are possible when the subjects of rights are free and equal persons. Although the claims that are put forward as "collective rights" may refer to interests and considerations that arise through and relate to individuals' membership in different forms of community (whether religious, cultural, linguistic, historical, or otherwise), they are claimed by certain individuals against others who need not share in the relevant form of community. They may only participate in the same form of legal relation or political association, in which they figure indistinguishably as free and equal persons. Indeed, this is the standard, and, theoretically, the most important case.
41 So I will consider the possibility of collective rights on this basis.
Let us recall several features of abstract right that bear importantly on our present question. First, personality, which is the basis of abstract right, consists in the self's capacity for unqualified independence from everything particular. Nodiing whatever is to be ascribed normative validity save that which can be chosen from a standpoint that consists in the self's unlimited independence from everything given to and not by its free purposive activity. Although, from a psychological, sociological, or historical point of view, there may certainly be given contexts that condition choice, it does not follow that from a moral point of view these contexts possess intrinsic normative significance. This must always be decided from the standpoint of the normative. And when the latter is constituted by personality alone, such contexts must be viewed as determinate restrictions that can have no intrinsic value or validity. Otherwise, individuals could not be viewed as genuinely accountable agents on the 40 . Ibid, at para. 145. 41. For a helpful discussion of the term "collective rights" and of the kinds of issues that are stake, see W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 138-40, 150-52.
conception of responsible agency elucidated and defended by both Kant and Hegel. Second, in the system of abstract right there is no reference to ends as such: freedom is not constituted here through the pursuit of ends, and so the moral power of personality is not the capacity to have a determinate conception of one's good but merely the bare capacity to abstract from all interests, ends, and so forth. In the practical philosophy of Hegel, abstract right is the only normative category that is framed in terms which make no reference whatever to ends. Third, abstract right entails a right to coerce. Its structure of correlative rights and duties can be vindicated by the use of coercion. Coercion is morally possible here precisely because the obligation in abstract right is wholly negative, external, and interactional; it does not postulate any ends as constitutive of agents' freedom. Where ends have intrinsic normative significance, coercion is illicit, being inconsistent with the possibility of an agent freely choosing something as an end. 42 Note that personality itself cannot be coerced. For coercion entails the imposition of an obstacle or hindrance from without, and this would be incompatible with personality's self-related and inward nature. It is only that which is external, in the sense discussed earlier, that can be subject to coercion.
If, as I have suggested, abstract right must be viewed as lexically first in a constructivist account, all other normative categories must respect what abstract right entails and must therefore be framed consistently with the three features just mentioned. What is more, respect for abstract right involves recognizing the difference between what is inalienable and what is alienable, in the following way/ 3 Personality, being unqualifiedly self-related, can never be treated merely as a means to something else; that is, it cannot be used as a thing and is not a possible object of ownership. Now the power to alienate is simply one manifestation of the capacity for ownership. Since something is mine only insofar as I have subjected it to my will, I can make the thing "not mine" by withdrawing my will from it (by giving up the thing either unconditionally, as something that I choose to abandon and to make ownerless, or conditionally, as something that I choose to transfer to another so that it may become his or hers). I, as owner, am under no duty to keep it-for this would be incompatible with abstract right's merely negative conception of obligation. But it is only the owner, through his or her own decision, who can alienate the thing. Both acquisition and alienation are equally powers mat are consistent with abstract right's imperative to respect the capacity for ownership. A crucial proviso here is that it is only things that can be alienated. It follows that personality, not being a thing, cannot itself be alienated. Entitlements and obligations, being grounded on personality, cannot be generated on a basis that denies personality. The right in one's personality is both inalienable and imprescriptible: I cannot lose the right either through the passage of time or through my willingness to give it up. So a contract of enslavement, for example, is ab initio null and void. Moreover, whatever capacities or powers that inhere in individuals qua persons are for the same reason inalienable. Thus, the capacity to acquire Ownership consistently with the principles of abstract right is inalienable and imprescriptible.
Stated in more general terms, whatever constitutes a person's selfrelatedness, in other words, whatever belongs to a person's inward, thinking relation to him or to herself, must be treated as inalienable and as not subject to coercion. 44 Now constructivism holds that if something is to be normatively valid and binding upon responsible agents it must be capable of satisfying the demands of practical thinking, as presented in Part One. More exactly, it must be capable of being validated from the standpoint of the agent's negative freedom, that is, with reference to one's relation with oneself in which every given content is dissipated-a relation which Hegel calls "the pure thought of oneself."
45 Translated into the categories of right and duty, this requirement implies that I, as a responsible agent, have the right to assert this standpoint vis-d-vis everything that would claim my recognition. Because this right reflects my self-consciousness as a person, it is inalienable and imprescriptible. Moreover, since the right represents a literally unrestricted standpoint that is categorially independent from every determinate content and interest, it cannot be limited by anything other than itself. Thus, there is no rate of exchange, as it were, between it and any human interest, in terms of which it might be permissible to balance respect for the one against recognition of the other. This right is simply not commensurable with anything else. Finally, as something that belongs to the inwardness of self-conscious freedom, the standpoint presupposed in this right is beyond coercion: the assertion of this standpoint can never be deemed a wrong; nor can it be responded to with coercion.
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In abstract right, where relations between individuals are judged solely in terms of the imperative to respect each other's equal capacity for ownership, the implications of this inalienable right are limited. Basically, rights-holders cannot bind themselves to alienate it, and others are not permitted to limit the right or to use coercion against right-holders who exercise it. However, consistent with the lexical priority of abstract right, the right must be respected as a necessary condition of the validity of all other normative categories. Thus, persons cannot alienate it to any external authority whatsoever-including the state; political legitimacy itself rests on the recognition of this limit. Nor may an external authority restrict this right for the purposes of realizing what may be otherwise valid objectives. The incommensurability of the right relative to human interests must be preserved if the lexical priority of abstract right is to be respected. But what, it may be asked, is the content of this right? What sorts of things are constituent elements of my inward, thinking relation to myself? Here, given the purposes of this essay, I shall merely present Hegel's own answer, without attempting to provide a full justification for it. Nevertheless, the hope is that in this way'we can begin to see whether, and if so under what conditions, collective rights are possible in a constructivist account of the normative.
In addition to personality itself, Hegel identifies one's religion, one's ethical life (namely, membership in the family, civil society, and the state), and one's individual moral responsibility as "substantive characteristics" that constitute "the universal essence of [one's] self-consciousness."
47 Because, and insofar as, all of these make normative claims on individuals, each of them must be validated and confirmed from the standpoint of persons' independence from everything given.
48 It must be possible for persons to make these substantive characteristics their own, and this implies that it must be possible for the characteristics to belong to persons on the basis of judgments that express their conception of themselves as thinking, responsible agents. But, to begin, this self-conception is framed in terms of the standpoint of independence from particularity. Recall that this standpoint is neither arbitrary nor "subjective": it represents a common point of view which is shared by all who are capable of viewing themselves as responsible and which abstracts absolutely from everything particular and given. In this way, it qualifies as an objective standpoint, at least for the purposes of a practical reason. Now, this normatively minimal relationship between persons and their substantive characteristics is given recognition through a set of basic rights or freedoms. For example, with respect to religion, no external authority has the right to determine what shall constitute an individual's faith or what qualifies as religious truth. Religious ideas are not forced upon persons; they contain only those determinations that individuals can recognize as and make their own. In short, "since the content of a man's faith depends on his private ideas, the state cannot interfere with it." 4 ' Of course, this does not necessarily exhaust the meaning or the content of freedom of religion and of conscience, but it does belong to its essence and it must be preserved in framing all other normative requirements.
These basic rights or freedoms will be, in th& first instance, what Constant called "the liberties of the modems". 50 The first condition of the validity of a 47. Ibid, at para. 66. See also Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutic, supra, note 8 at 27. 48. Strictly speaking, we are now supposing that persons have the realization of their personality, that is, of their capacity for abstraction, for their end and goal. In Hegel's account, this highest-order interest belongs to the stage that follows abstract right, namely, "morality." As Hegel puts it: "Its personality-and in abstract right the will is personality and no more-it [the will] now has for its object...." Philosophy of Right, supra, note 3 at para. 104. Personality is now viewed by the subject as something to be expressed in whatever relates to him or her as an accountable agent. 49. Ibid, at para. 270 R. 50. As discussed in Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and their Priority", supra, note 35 at 13.1 say "in the first instance" because it is certainly arguable (as Rawls contends) that among the basic rights or freedoms will be political liberties of participation and other "liberties of the ancients." The central point is that a constructivist account of basic liberties begins with those liberties (or aspects thereof) that can be justified on the basis of the abstract standpoint of personality as such.
conception of social justice will be that it includes a principle that commands respect for them, in the sense that they are to be ascribed lexical priority. Consistent with this priority, there cannot be, at least for the purposes of what Rawls calls "ideal theory," any trade-offs between the basic liberties and other interests or considerations. So, for example, there can be no rate of exchange between this principle and, say, one that requires social and economic inequalities to be ordered and justified in accordance with definite criteria. Nor can the latter principle provide a reason for limiting the former. Vis-a-vis other principles of justice, the principle guaranteeing the basic liberties is first and absolute. Of course, the complete and systematic specification of the content of the basic rights and liberties that come under this principle is a task of the first importance, one that, to the best of my knowledge, Hegel does not explicitly undertake and one that is certainly beyond the limited scope of the brief remarks presented here. 51 However, whatever their content turns out to be, we can know this much in advance: the basic liberties must, in the first place, be rooted in the self's capacity to think of itself as unqualifiedly independent from everything particular and in its capacity to constitute itself as an accountable self through this inward, contentless self-relation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the priority of the basic liberties is not justified by reason of their importance to our ability to lead a good life, to pursue ends that are genuinely worth realizing, or to decide what is truly valuable in life. In short, they are not accorded priority because they provide conditions that are essential to our forming and revising conceptions of our good. Such reference to ends is precluded where, as I have suggested, it is the capacity for abstraction that is the moral power which is the first and ultimate ground of the requirement to respect the basic liberties. Indeed, it is only because agents can view themselves initially in complete abstraction from all ends that the incommensurability, and hence the priority, of these liberties can be accounted for. This is not to say that the basic liberties cannot be viewed as valuable in relation to our interest in leading a good life. On the contrary. The point is simply that their justification first consists in establishing their significance as requirements entailed by the moral power of personality, which is categorially indifferent to such teleological considerations. Accordingly, in the first instance (which establishes their priority), we need not ask why they are valuable. More exactly, in the first stage of Hegel's constructivist account, there simply is no basis for asking this question. And the answer to it forms no part of the justification of their priority. At this point, the concept of the good is not yet a validated normative category.
Any justification of collective rights must be consistent with the priority of these basic liberties. Rather than try to determine whether there can indeed be a justification that meets this constraint, I shall conclude this discussion by considering briefly two kinds of justification for collective rights that have been recently advanced, which, for the sake of convenience, I will style as "communitarian" and "liberal" in conception. 
Benson
The communitarian justification starts with the basic premise that membership in, say, a particular culture is constitutive, at the deepest level, of what persons are.
52 Such membership entails one's identifying with a form of life that is defined by shared ends and conceptions of the good. Moreover, on this view, identification with a form of life is not something chosen as such, but rather recognized or found. The imperative to respect persons requires, then, that cultural membership, understood in this way, be respected in its own right. Various measures, including legal collective rights, ought to be implemented to ensure the existence and the stability of cultural communities with their particular practices and shared ends.
But this justification is excluded by the priority of abstract right. On Hegel's account, it is mistaken to hold that persons are, in the first instance or minimally, constituted by any conception of ends, whether shared or otherwise. The first condition of the possibility of responsible agency is that individuals be constituted as personality, and therefore by its contentless self-relatedness that is characterized by indifference to everything particular. Once this is granted, this standpoint, and along with it the non-distributive and noncommunitarian conception of obligation that rests on it (namely, abstract right), must be ascribed lexical priority: respect for abstract personality, and whatever this entails, constrains whatever else is to count as normatively valid. Accordingly, unconditional respect for the priority of the basic liberties must set the framework within which the protection and promotion of cultural communities is to take place. But this is no longer a recognizably "communitarian" view.
Since Hegel's account has sometimes been misleadingly characterized as "communitarian," it should be emphasized that, for Hegel, the elucidation of the idea of community as part of freedom must follow abstract right in the order of deduction. The claim is that unless we begin with abstract personality, we are necessarily subject to unconstrained particularity (which, as a category of practical thinking, is feeling or inclination), and hence with something that is neither intrinsically accessible to everyone nor shareable by all. As Hegel puts it so beautifully, "[t]he man [who] makes his appeal to feeling...is finished and done with anyone who does not agree... [and] ...who does not find and feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of humanity. For it is in the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds."
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Respect for abstract personality is the essential first condition of the possibility of genuine community that is constituted by mutual recognition among responsible agents and that is expressive of the conception of themselves as accountable.
One of the more interesting recent efforts to justify collective rights on the basis of a liberal conception of justice is Will Kymlicka's defence, which he explicitly frames in Rawlsian terms. It is therefore important to consider certain aspects of his argument which seem to relate most fundamentally to the central claims of this essay. The discussion will have to be brief.
M
In contrast to the communitarian approach, Kymlicka argues that, on a liberal view, collective rights must not be justified on the basis that they are necessary for the promotion of certain particular ends and practices, however desirable and valuable they may be. Ends are to be treated always as matters of free individual choice, not as something given or found, nor as something to be furthered by coercive means. Collective rights, it must not be forgotten, are legal rights enforced by the state's coercive powers. Thus Kymlicka acknowledges the central importance of the basic liberties (as specified, for example, in Rawls' first principle of justice), and he seeks to elaborate a conception of collective rights that can be justified consistent with their importance. The argument may be divided into two stages.
In the first, Kymlicka adduces the reason why a liberal conception of justice views the basic liberties as centrally important and he suggests that this reason also establishes the importance of what he calls the good of cultural membership. Indeed, cultural membership, he concludes, must be deemed a primary good (in Rawls' sense of the term), just as the basic liberties are. Now the primary good of cultural membership must be framed consistent with the liberal premise that the pursuit of ends is a matter of free individual choice. To meet this requirement, Kymlicka introduces a distinction between culture viewed as a "context of choice," and culture defined in terms of "the character of a historical community". It is only culture in the first sense that constitutes a primary good. Conceived as a context of choice, culture consists in the range of options, the different ways of life, which individuals take as given and from which they must choose when they decide upon their preferred conception of their good. The thought here is that individuals do not begin de novo in fashioning their goals and in deciding how to lead their lives: the process of deliberation and choice is situated in an inherited context which provides them with a determinate range of values and forms of life. Culture as context is thus not itself chosen. In contrast, the character of a particular culture is constituted by shared practices and ends that are (potentially) always subject to revision or rejection. On a liberal view, they must be freely chosen.
In the light of this distinction, Kymlicka argues that cultural membership (as it relates to the context of choice) can and must be recognized as a primary good if we are to take seriously the very reason that justifies our ascribing fundamental importance to the basic liberties. Briefly stated, the reason why we consider the basic liberties to be so important is, according to Kymlicka, that they guarantee social conditions that are needed if persons are to choose conceptions of their good freely and intelligently. As conscious and purposive agents, individuals try to achieve goals based on the beliefs they have about what is valuable. It is crucial to them that it at least be possible to form beliefs that are both genuinely their own and rationally informed. The basic liberties answer this concern. But individuals do not form these beliefs de novo; they always result from a process of selecting what seems to be most valuable from the various options available, that is, from culture viewed as a context of choice. Consequently, respect for cultural membership is also needed if their concern is to be adequately met. The existence of a rich and secure cultural structure is also an essential precondition of the intelligent and meaningful formation of beliefs about the good life.
In the second stage of his argument, Kymlicka justifies collective rights as one means to redress the unequal circumstances in which minority cultures may find themselves. The relevant unequal circumstance is this: the very existence of a minority cultural community (viewed as a context of choice) can be vulnerable to the decisions of members of the majority culture. Kymlicka stresses that this vulnerability may exist even before members of the minority culture make their choices as to common or individual ends. The thought here is that minorities may be compelled to devote resources and to take special measures to preserve their particular contexts of choice from the effects of decisions by members of the majority culture, whereas the latter need not do the same. In this way, members of minority cultures are collectively disadvantaged relative to the majority, irrespective of the goals and projects they may eventually decide to pursue. For it is the existence and the security of their context of choice that is endangered. And since this context is not itself chosen, it is not something for which individuals can be viewed as responsible. Therefore, the protection of a cultural context does not amount to giving preference to the revisable goals of some over those of others who do not share that culture. Collective rights to secure a minority's context of choice, even at the expense of the recognized rights and liberties of the members of the majority culture, is a response, not to its shared choices, but to its unequal circumstances.
With this outline of Kymlicka's argument in mind, let me now try to assess it in relation to the claim concerning the priority of abstract right. We have seen that the whole argument depends upon the validity of the distinction between the two senses of culture. Unless culture, as a context of choice, can be distinguished from its character in the categorial terms suggested by Kymlicka, the argument will be incompatible with its liberal premise. The categorial difference between them, it will be recalled, is that culture as context does not itself consist in shared ends that are chosen on an individual basis, whereas culture, viewed in terms of its character, does. My analysis comprises two parts. In the first, I grant the distinction and see whether the argument can adequately address the claim of the priority of abstract right. The second part questions whether the distinction has in fact been made out from a moral point of view.
On the assumption that the categorial distinction between cultural context and character is valid, the argument for collective rights requires that we view cultural membership as a primary good that has the same kind of importance as the basic liberties. Although Kymlicka holds that the recognition of the basic liberties is an essential part of an acceptable conception of justice, he denies that they should be viewed as prior, in the sense suggested by Rawls. The point is crucial because, according to Kymlicka, collective rights are incompatible with the strict priority of the basic liberties.
55 Now, as discussed above, Kymlicka argues that the very reason we regard the basic liberties as so important establishes cultural membership as a primary good that has the same kind of importance. But the reason he advances for the importance of the basic liberties is their relation to the pursuit of our essential interest in leading a good life. This reason supposes, then, that the relevant moral power is the capacity to have and to pursue a determinate conception of the good and that the realization of particular ends has intrinsic normative worth. If, however, there is a conception of basic liberties that expresses, even in the first instance, the irreducibly minimal standpoint of the self's independence from particularity-and this content alone, Kymlicka's argument cannot exclude the possibility that this conception of liberty will be normatively prior to the good of cultural membership and incommensurable with it. This is exactly what I have tried to suggest, albeit sketchily, in the preceding remarks. The kind of reason Kymlicka puts forward to justify the good of cultural membership must itself presuppose the self's capacity to abstract from all determinations-at least if agents are to be viewed as truly accountable and as possibly subject to the unconditional imperatives of practical reasons. And, given this initial standpoint of independence, there can be no contexts or other limitations which, on a constructivist conception of me normative, can be ultimately and irreducibly constraining with respect to the faculty of free choice. The issue here is, of course, not the empirical (whether psychological, sociological, or historical) significance of a cultural context, but only its normative import.
But can the distinction between context and character be sustained from a moral point of view? To simplify, a constructivist approach divides duties into those which are juridical and those which are ethical. The first must be justified on grounds that completely abstract from all ends; the second belong to a doctrine of obligatory ends. There is, on this conception, no middle ground between the two. But culture as context purports to be just such a third term, irreducible to both the standpoint of abstraction and the pursuit of ends. Does Kymlicka's characterization of culture as context support this conclusion? Kymlicka never shows that a context of choice is anything other than the totality of the forms of life, roles, and valuable options it offers: it is conceived as providing a range of options, which is never more than the sum of its parts. 
Benson
Viewed in itself, this conception of context does not incorporate any standpoint or category whatsoever that transcends, while preserving, its constituent parts. But these parts are values and ends, whose essential intelligibility lies in their being something to be chosen. There does not seem to be any basis for making the kind of categorial distinction that Kymlicka's argument requires.
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Certainly, from a psychological, sociological, or developmental standpoint, individuals may relate to their cultural context as something given and not chosen. Subjectively, it may thus be distinguishable from the character of their culture, which consists in particular evolving practices viewed as the outcome of its members' choices. But this difference between the two senses of culture is one that exists solely for the individual members of the culture taken one by one, and then only as part of a process that is differentiated on the basis of time: in culture as context, the particular ends and values are viewed as given by an individual who is about to choose, whereas, as constitutive of the character of the culture, the very same ends are represented as the achievements of individual choices. The crucial point is that the context is constituted through and through by features that are intelligible as ends-to-be chosen. Culture as context and the character of culture have exactly the same content.
The apparent impossibility of sustaining a categorial distinction between context and ends on the basis of Kymlicka's characterization may be usefully contrasted with Rawls' own discussion of cultural association, which Kymlicka explicitly invokes in his elucidation of culture as context. Kymlicka refers with approval to Rawls' statement that "...in drawing up our plan of life we do not start de novo..." but we are offered "... definite ideals and forms of life that have been developed and tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes for generations."
57 But what Kymlicka's own argument fails to take seriously is what Rawls conceives to be "the main idea" that is at stake here: namely, that this range of options has its unity as a context for choice in virtue of a public conception of justice that embodies the priority of right. The context provided by a social union of social unions presupposes a standpoint that is not itself constituted by the conceptions of the good that may be freely chosen. And it is only through this standpoint that there is a framework which is irreducible, though not inhospitable to, determinate ends and projects. It is the public conception of justice, framed in terms that are categorially distinct from individuals' conceptions of the good, that provides the context within which ends may be (permissibly) chosen. But, of course, this public conception of justice rests on the priority of the basic liberties.
The failure to distinguish context and character means that one cannot hold, as Kymlicka does, that cultural membership is a primary good which would be wanted by the parties in Rawls' original position. Indeed, with the collapse of the distinction, there is no stopping short of the communitarian conception, which I considered and rejected above. Moreover, the failure to make out a categorial difference between context and character is reflected in the way Kymlicka argues, in the second stage, for the existence of disadvantage requiring redress. The only standpoint mat seems to be presupposed is that of individuals vis-a-vis their own culture. From this standpoint, as I have already said, it may certainly be true that individuals view their culture as something given, not chosen; and so the protection of that context against its vulnerability to the decisions of non-members need not be regarded, from the viewpoint of its own members, as giving preference to their own choices over those of nonmembers. But the idea of disadvantage is comparative as between different cultural communities, and therefore it must be evaluated from the standpoint of all. Viewed from the perspective of non-members, a given cultural context is a complex of ends, projects, and values (even in congealed form, as it were), and so its protection in the way suggested by Kymlicka does necessarily entail the forwarding of a set of determinate conceptions of the good as such. However, this is incompatible with the liberal premises which Kymlicka himself postulates as fundamental.
I have considered two of the more important kinds of justification of collective rights and have found them to be seriously wanting when they are viewed from a constructivist standpoint. This, of course, does not establish that mere cannot be a justification of collective rights that is consistent with the representation of persons as free and equal. However, there is good reason to doubt the possibility. For if there is to be a meaningful notion of collective rights, it must, I think, be shown to be a primary good (in Rawls' sense of the term) that can be set off against the basic liberties. But it is difficult to conceive of a distinctive primary good of cultural membership that can be framed in terms that are categorially independent of persons' determinate conceptions of their good. Unless this is indeed possible, it cannot be incorporated into a constructivist account without undermining it at its core. Of course, throughout this essay I have presupposed, without attempting to justify, a constructivist conception of the normative. This does not mean, however, that it cannot be supported by our intuitions. Quite the contrary. For as I mentioned in my introductory remarks, constructivism presents itself as a systematic elucidation of a conception of responsible agency that can be readily and clearly discerned in the most ordinary moral judgments of ourselves as accountable, if only we consult them. 58. In order to assess the fairness of this conclusion it is important to keep in mind that the principle guaranteeing the basic liberties will be supplemented by one that assures the fair value of those liberties. In Rawls* theory, the disappearance of a way of life (assuming full compliance with the two principles of justice) is viewed as raising no issue of justice vis-a-vis the persons who espoused it. It reflects the regrettable fact that "no society can include within itself all forms of life." Rawls, supra, note 55 at 265. The matter of limited social space is always relative to a given conception of justice and indeed is not intelligible apart from it. In justice as fairness, the resulting social space is sufficient if it allows for the possibility of an overlapping consensus, a question that goes to the stability of the conception of justice, not its reasonableness. Ibid, at 266.
